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POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AS PRESIDENTIAL
CONSTITUTIONALISM?
DAVID L. FRANKLIN*
In this essay I would like to make three points. First, although Larry
Kramer makes "popular constitutionalism" the conceptual centerpiece of
the book that occasioned this symposium, l it is not at all clear what popular
constitutionalism is. I am going to suggest that Kramer's work, both in The
People Themselves and in his other writings, can be read to embody two
very different versions of popular constitutionalism, which I will call the
populist sensibility model and the departmentalist model. Second, no matter
which of these two models Kramer has in mind, he has made a valuable
contribution by reminding us from a historical perspective that the meaning
of the Constitution is not now, and has never been, identical to the doc-
trines the Supreme Court uses to implement that meaning. Third, and most
troubling, those who march under the loose banner of popular constitution-
alism have said very little about the particular institutional mechanisms that
would make their vision a reality in today's world. In particular, I suggest,
popular constitutionalism in 2006 may in practice mean presidential consti-
tutionalism-an outcome that should give us cause for concern.
Before continuing, I must issue a disclaimer: I am not a legal histo-
rian. Because this symposium features contributions from Morton Horwitz,
Jack Rakove, and many other preeminent legal historians, I will largely
leave it to others to comment on Kramer's historical claims and methods.
* Assistant Professor, DePaul University College of Law. I am grateful to Dan Hamilton for
inviting me to present a version of this paper at the symposium that gave rise to this volume, and to
Stephen Siegel, Bradley Joondeph, and Kevin Stack for helpful discussions during the preparation of
this essay. I would also like to register a debt of gratitude-though this has nothing to do with popular
constitutionalism-to Larry Kramer for his scholarship in the area of Conflict of Laws. Those of us who
have occasion to teach in that field have long been grateful for Kramer's articles, which come as close
as humanly possible to solving the serious constitutional problems posed by the modem approach to
choice of law known as "interest analysis"--problems that the founder of interest analysis, Brainerd
Currie, never managed to solve. I am thinking in particular of Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage,
Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional Public Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965 (1997); Larry
Kramer, Return of the Renvoi, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 979 (1991); Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law,
90 COLUM. L. REV. 277 (1990); and Larry Kramer, The Myth of the "Unprovided-For" Case, 75 VA. L.
REV. 1045 (1989).
1. LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL
REVIEW (2004).
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Instead, I want to discuss what his core idea of popular constitutionalism
might mean for us today, as law professors, as lawyers, and as citizens.
Having made that disclaimer, let me say that even a careful reader can
come away from The People Themselves without a firm idea of what its
author means by the concept that forms his central theme. Popular constitu-
tionalism, as Kramer describes it in the historical section that occupies
most of the book, is a moving target. 2 In the eighteenth century, he says, it
was characterized by direct and often spontaneous popular action such as
mobbing, civil disobedience, and jury nullification. 3 By 1803, when Chief
Justice John Marshall decided Marbury v. Madison, popular constitutional-
ism had morphed into what we could call interpretive departmentalism, a
system in which "courts had the same duty and the same obligation to en-
force the Constitution as everyone else, both in and out of government."
'4
By around 1830, Kramer concedes, interpretive departmentalism had
largely given way to judicial supremacy-so much so that even a formerly
staunch departmentalist like James Madison was willing to state publicly
that the federal courts should enjoy the last word on constitutional ques-
tions, at least on questions of federalism. 5 In short, Kramer's story-which
essentially ends in the 1840s if we put to one side the final chapter's dizzy-
ing time-lapse sequence that covers the past century and a half of constitu-
tional development in less than twenty pages 6 -is the story of the rise of
judicial review and, eventually, judicial supremacy. Yet, puzzlingly,
Kramer insists that in the battle between popular constitutionalism and
judicial supremacy, "[w]hat is certain is that popular constitutionalism was
the clear victor each time matters came to a head."'7
What, then, is the present-day content of this "popular constitutional-
ism" that emerges, constantly embattled yet ultimately triumphant, from
Kramer's narrative? This turns out to be a surprisingly difficult question to
answer.
Some of Kramer's writings, both in The People Themselves and else-
where, suggest that he has in mind a rather modest form of present-day
2. Some of the book's reviewers have expressed the same concern, so I will not dwell for too
long on it here. See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Lawrence B. Solum, Popular? Constitutionalism?, 118
HARV. L. REv. 1594 (2005) (book review).
3. KRAMER, supra note 1, at 3-5 (offering "snapshot" examples from the 1790s of each of these
phenomena).
4. Id. at 127.
5. Id. at 187 ("[1]n both rhetoric and emphasis, Madison had elevated the courts' role considera-
bly above what he had been prepared to concede in 1800.").
6. Id. at 207-26.
7. ld. at 207.
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popular constitutionalism-a populist sensibility model. 8 The populist sen-
sibility model is willing to accommodate judicial supremacy, at least on
certain issues, but refuses to tolerate what Kramer calls "judicial sover-
eignty." 9 A commitment to popular constitutionalism under this view en-
tails primarily a change in attitude. Lawyers, politicians, and, above all,
engaged citizens ought to stop viewing "democratic politics as scary and
threatening."' 0 They should stop interpreting "the Constitution in exclu-
sively counter-majoritarian terms."1 l And, most of all, they should stop
thinking of the Court as their infallible constitutional taskmaster.12 Recip-
rocally, Supreme Court Justices should pay greater attention to the people's
judgments and show more modesty about their own interpretive role. 13 On
this model, popular constitutionalism is not a specific program or institu-
tional arrangement. It is, rather, a tonic: a much-needed reminder for peo-
ple to quit acting as if the Court had a monopoly on constitutional meaning.
Even if this unassuming model of popular constitutionalism is all
Kramer has in mind, he has performed a valuable service by providing a
historical narrative to reinforce the critique that is increasingly, and rightly,
leveled at the current Supreme Court-namely, that the Court too often
conflates the Constitution's actual meaning with the lawyers' doctrines that
the Court uses to decide constitutional cases. This is a category mistake,
one that the Rehnquist Court committed in a particularly troubling way in
cases involving Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Interstate
Commerce Clause' 4-although the Court seemed to recognize the error of
its ways in Chief Justice Rehnquist's final few terms. 15 For example, the
8. 1 have adapted the name for this model from one of the subchapter headings in Kramer's final
chapter: "A Matter of Sensibility." Id. at 241 (quoting RICHARD D. PARKER, "HERE, THE PEOPLE
RULE": A CONSTITUTIONAL POPULIST MANIFESTO 4 (1994)).
9. See Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term-Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV.
L REV. 4, 163 (2001) [hereinafter Kramer, We the Court] ("There is a place for judicial supremacy, but
it has bounds. There is no place for the totalizing claims of judicial sovereignty."). Kramer's Foreword
sets forth an earlier version of the argument made at greater length in The People Themselves.
10. KRAMER, supra note 1, at 242.
11. Id.
12. In this regard, Kramer quotes a revealing comment from a New York Times article describing
the results of a recently completed Supreme Court Term as "a report card on the elected branches." Id.
at 244 (quoting Supreme Court Term: Beyond Bush v. Gore, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2001, at Al).
13. See id. at 253 (arguing that Supreme Court Justices should adjust their "attitudes and self-
conception" so as to recognize that the people are "a higher authority out there with power to overtum
their decisions").
14. See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598 (2000); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary
Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507
(1997); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
15. See Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005); Tenn. v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004); Nev.
Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
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Court sometimes forgets that rational basis review is a lens through which
the judiciary, for reasons of institutional capacity, views the work of the
political branches, rather than a statement of what the Constitution actually
means. 16 To be sure, this is not an earthshaking insight-in his Harvard
Law Review Foreword from a few years ago, Kramer calls it "freshman
stuff1 7-and plenty of scholars from James Bradley Thayer to Lawrence
Sager to Kermit Roosevelt have fleshed out this critique in useful ways.
18
What Kramer gives us is a historical narrative to help explain how the gen-
eral public has come to buy into this category mistake.
Building on this critique of the current Court, two further observations
should be made that are of special interest for the would-be popular consti-
tutionalist. First, it is important not to oversell the specter of judicial sover-
eignty. Although the Court has claimed interpretive exclusivity over a few
important domains of constitutional law, 19 most areas of public decision-
making remain almost wholly within the control of the politically account-
able branches. Thanks to doctrines of deference, judicially under-enforced
constitutional norms, 20 and self-imposed limits on justiciability, we can be
reasonably certain that even our imperial Court will not second-guess any
of the following:
16. Kramer accurately describes the constitutional settlement that lasted from 1937 until around
1995 and that subjected most legislation to minimal judicial scrutiny:
The critical thing to understand about rational basis scrutiny is that it was a rule of judicial re-
straint, not substantive constitutional law. It did not mean that laws were constitutional if they
were rational. Rather, the decision whether a particular law was constitutional was made by
the legislature, with the Court's power of review limited to questioning the legislature's de-
termination only in the rare case where Congress could not be said to have had a "rational ba-
sis" for what it did. By using this device, the Court ceded a quite substantial area of
constitutional authority to political officials.
KRAMER, supra note 1, at 219.
17. Kramer, We the Court, supra note 9, at 146-47.
18. See, e.g., James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional
Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893); Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underen-
forced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978); David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Pro-
phylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190, 190 (1988); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996
Term-Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54 (1997); Daryl J. Levinson,
Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857 (1999); Robert C. Post &
Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the
Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L. J. 1943 (2003); Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Deci-
sion Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1 (2004); Kermit Roosevelt Ill, Constitutional Calcification: How the Law
Becomes What the Court Does, 91 VA. L. REV. 1649 (2005).
19. See Garrett, 531 U.S. 356; Morrison, 529 U.S. 598; Kimel, 528 U.S. 62; Fla. Prepaid, 527
U.S. 627; Flores, 521 U.S. 507; Lopez, 514 U.S. 549.
20. See Sager, supra note 18, at 1213.
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- the invidiousness vel non of the huge majority of statutes that clas-
sify people other than by race, gender, or a few other suspect crite-
ria; 21
- the public-regardingness vel non of the huge category of statutes
that regulate the economy and social welfare;
22
- the scope and application of the Necessary and Proper Clause in
most contexts;23
- the scope of the "General Welfare Clause" that authorizes federal
taxing and spending laws;
24
- the tightness of the fit between conditional exercises of the federal
spending power and the conditions imposed;
25
- Congress's power to delegate broad lawmaking authority to others
outside the legislative branch;
26
- most issues concerning the allocation of war-making, 27 foreign af-
fairs, 28 and treaty-making 29 powers;
- the exercise of the pardon power, the veto power, and prosecutorial
discretion;
30
- the conduct of the impeachment process. 31
And obviously the list could go on from there. Kramer is right to be
concerned about judicial self-aggrandizement, but as the foregoing list
suggests, the sky is not falling yet.
A second cautionary observation follows from the first. Once we ac-
cept, with Kramer and others, that the Constitution's own requirements are
21. See, e.g., FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314-15 (1993) ("On rational-basis
review, a classification in a statute.., comes to us bearing a strong presumption of validity, and those
attacking the rationality of the legislative classification have the burden to negative every conceivable
basis which might support it .... [L]egislative choice is not subject to courtroom factfinding and may
be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.") (citations omitted).
22. See, e.g., Usery v. Turner Elkhom Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976) ("It is by now well
established that legislative Acts adjusting the burdens and benefits of economic life come to the Court
with a presumption of constitutionality, and that the burden is on one complaining of a due process
violation to establish that the legislature has acted in an arbitrary and irrational way.").
23. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2115-20 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring).
24. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 208 (1987) ("[T]he concept of welfare or the
opposite is shaped by Congress.") (citation omitted).
25. See, e.g., Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600 (2004).
26. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474-75 (2001) ("[W]e have 'al-
most never felt qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy judgment
that can be left to those executing or applying the law."') (citation omitted).
27. See, e.g., Doe v. Bush, 323 F.3d 133 (1st Cir. 2003) (dismissing constitutional challenge to
war in Iraq).
28. See, e.g., Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948).
29. See, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (plurality opinion).
30. See, e.g., Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973).
31. See, e.g., Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993).
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different from and broader than the doctrinal tests the Court uses to decide
constitutional cases, we must also accept that there are a lot more constitu-
tional questions out there than we as lawyers are accustomed to thinking
about. To return to our earlier example, the best understanding of the actual
meaning of the Due Process Clause-and, for that matter, the General Wel-
fare Clause-may well be that legislation must pursue public rather than
merely private interests. 32 This is true notwithstanding the fact that, since
1937, the Supreme Court has chosen as a matter of judicial doctrine to de-
fer to legislatures regarding most social and economic legislation, review-
ing it only for minimal rationality. In a world of popular constitutionalism,
whenever Congress regulates or appropriates-and, by extension, in many
instances in which the Executive Branch enforces federal statutes or spends
public money-those public actors are called upon to make constitutional
judgments: Does this legislation serve the public interest? Does it promote
the general welfare? Does it classify people for good enough reasons?
Kramer insists that the Constitution is not ordinary law, that constitu-
tional questions should not be reduced to mere exercises in lawyers' rea-
soning.33 My point here is that the converse is also true-on the popular
constitutionalist understanding, many things we are used to thinking of as
questions of ordinary law or policy turn out to be constitutional questions.
This means that popular constitutionalism, even within the relatively mod-
est populist sensibility model, places a heavy responsibility on the people
and the popular branches of government to develop, articulate, and carry
out their own constitutional visions. Moreover, this responsibility rests on
the people all the time: in Kramer's account, unlike Bruce Ackerman's,34
there is no "dualist" separation between ordinary politics and constitutional
politics. 35 In my view, Kramer is too quick to reject Ackerman-style dual-
ism, for there are advantages to marking out the realm of constitutional
decision-making as something distinct from the background noise of politi-
cal bargaining. We should require the people to speak loud and long before
32. Cf CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION (1993).
33. Kramer, We the Court, supra note 9, at 14 ("The last, faint traces of popular constitutionalism
are fading, threatened by a Court that truly sees the Constitution as nothing more than ordinary law.").
34. 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE
PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998).
35. KRAMER, supra note 1, at 197 (seemingly rejecting Ackerman's dualist approach by remark-
ing that his "distinction between 'normal' and 'higher' politics would have struck a Jacksonian as
bizarre and anti-republican: exactly the sort of ploy aristocrats were always inventing to divest the
people themselves of authority").
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we deem them to have spoken with a constitutional voice.36 After all, if
everything is constitutional politics, then everything is ordinary politics.
37
I suspect, moreover, that Kramer is aiming for more than the populist
sensibility model. At the end of the day, he rejects the notion of giving the
Supreme Court the final word in constitutional interpretation. The Epilogue
to The People Themselves is entitled "Judicial Review Without Judicial
Supremacy. ' 38 Kramer wants the people to do more than simply adjust
their attitudes or feel more entitled to critique the Court. He wants them-
us-to be in charge of what the Constitution means. "The Supreme Court is
not the highest authority in the land on constitutional law," he writes. "We
are." 39
How, exactly, are we supposed to exercise this authority? It can't be
through direct action such as mobbing or jury nullification. The eighteenth-
century manifestations of popular constitutionalism that seem so dear to
Kramer, however crucial they may have been in framing the Framing, no
longer have the central role they once had. To be sure, "the people" still get
mobilized to some degree on Election Day, periodically in demonstrations
about controversial issues, and even occasionally in violent protests.40 And
perhaps modem technologies such as the Internet promise a new era of
direct, decentralized popular mobilization around political (and, by exten-
sion, constitutional) issues. But it is safe to say that popular constitutional-
ism in 2006 cannot be primarily driven by what Kramer likes to call "the
people out-of-doors." '41 Politics, including constitutional politics, has be-
come thoroughly domesticated, mediated, and institutionalized, so that the
role once played directly by the people is now played by elected represen-
tatives, national political parties, interest groups, and the media. In short,
the people ain't what they used to be.
36. 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 34, at 6 (describing preconditions, including supermajorities and
repeated electoral victories, for "higher lawmaking").
37. I am grateful to Richard Primus for this formulation of the point.
38. KRAMER, supra note 1, at 249.
39. Id. at 248.
40, It would be interesting to know whether Kramer believes setting a car on fire in a Paris
banlieue to express frustration at one's lack of full participation in the social and economic life of
France counts as an act of popular constitutionalism. See, e.g., Craig S. Smith, Angry Immigrants
Embroil France in Wider Riots, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2005, at Al. Why shouldn't it?
41. See, e.g., KRAMER, supra note 1, at 35 ("[B]y the middle of the eighteenth century the ortho-
dox view in England located sovereignty in Parliament rather than in the people out-of-doors."); id. at
47 ("The men who led the campaign for a new Constitution were not fans of the people out-of-doors;
they preferred a more sedate style of politics, safely controlled by gentlemen like themselves.").
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Kramer is fully aware of this.42 That is why, rather than settling for the
populist sensibility model or dreaming about a return to eighteenth-century
direct action, he tends instead to advocate a departmentalist model of popu-
lar constitutionalism. We have already encountered the idea of departmen-
talism, an arrangement whereby each branch of the federal government
enjoys not only independent interpretive authority but also independent
power to transform its constitutional visions into reality.43 This model is
suggested by Kramer's rather ominous statement toward the end of the
book:
The Constitution leaves room for countless political responses to an
overly assertive Court: Justices can be impeached, the Court's budget
can be slashed, the President can ignore its mandates, Congress can strip
it of jurisdiction or shrink its size or pack it with new members or give it
burdensome new responsibilities or revise its procedures.
44
(This observation has the tone of a mafia henchman's knuckle-cracking
threat: That's a nice Supreme Court you got there. It would be a shame if
anything were to, you know ... happen to it.)
Departmentalism is subject to many objections, which have been am-
ply registered in other places. 45 My purpose here, as someone who is
broadly sympathetic to the departmentalist project, is to pose a simple
question: Whom do we trust to speak for the people in constitutional mat-
ters?
Any attempt to assess the capacity of any person or institution to
speak for "the people" in constitutional matters is plagued by both an evi-
dentiary problem and a baseline problem. The evidentiary problem is that
in order to judge how accurately an institution conveys the constitutional
views of "the people," it is necessary first to measure those views in their
"raw" form, and this is quite difficult to do.46 The baseline problem is that
42. See, e.g., id. at 167-68 (documenting the rise of the party system in the 1840s and 1850s and
concluding that, "[i]n short, politics moved indoors").
43. See, e.g., id, at 109 ("Within this new political culture [of the 1790s], the departmental theory
made perfect sense. Each branch could express its views as issues came before it in the ordinary course
of business: the legislature by enacting laws, the executive by vetoing them, the judiciary by reviewing
them. But none of the branches' views were final or authoritative. They were the actions of regulated
entities striving to follow the law that governed them, subject to ongoing supervision by their common
superior, the people themselves.").
44. Id. at 249. See also id. at 252 (describing the book's project as posing "the choice between a
system of judicial supremacy and one based on departmental or coordinate construction").
45, See, e.g., Alexander & Solum, supra note 2, at 1609-15 (critiquing as unworkable both "di-
vided" and "overlapping" departmentalism); Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial
Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARv. L. REv. 1359 (1997) (defending judicial supremacy largely on
the basis of the Court's superior ability to bring final settlement to issues on which various government
actors may disagree).
46. Some would argue that "the people" are too ignorant about our Constitution to have well-
considered views concerning its meaning. An oft-cited 1997 survey, for example, indicated that only
[Vol 81:1069
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nonjudicial actors almost certainly perform quite differently under our pre-
sent regime of judicial supremacy than they would in a system that lacked
what Mark Tushnet has called the "judicial overhang." 4 7 But even ac-
knowledging these difficulties, it seems possible to reach tentative conclu-
sions about an institution's capacity for engaging in popular
constitutionalism by examining the deliberativeness and transparency with
which it approaches constitutional issues and the reasonableness of its re-
sultant positions on those issues.
48
The People Themselves, somewhat surprisingly, does not answer-or
even pose-the question of which institutions are well-equipped to speak
for the people today.4 9 We can get some hints, however, by looking at
Kramer's other writings. For instance, he has forcefully argued that when it
comes to questions of constitutional federalism, the national political par-
ties have taken over the equilibrating function once played, in Herbert
Wechsler's famous account, by structural mechanisms like the Electoral
College and the pre-17th Amendment Senate. 50 Perhaps, then, we can trust
the parties to speak for the people more generally on constitutional ques-
tions.
I am skeptical about this proposition for several reasons, including the
simple fact that party leaders and elected representatives do not get much
attention or credit for addressing constitutional issues as such, and thus do
19% of Americans know when the Constitution was drafted; 85% believe the Constitution states that
"all men are equal"; 42% do not know that the federal government has three branches; a majority thinks
the President is directly elected; a majority does not know that there are 100 Senators; and 42% believe
the Constitution establishes English as the official language. National Constitution Center, Startling
Lack of Constitutional Knowledge Revealed in First-Ever National Poll,
http://www.constitutioncenter.org/CitizenAction/CivicResearchResults/NCCNationalPoll/index.shtmi
(last visited Mar. 16, 2006). Although survey results like these do suggest the need for constitutional
education of the kind proposed by Sheldon Nahmod in this volume, I do not think the popular constitu-
tionalist has to view them as cause for despair. On a wide range of basic constitutional questions-
Should Congress have the power to protect endangered species? Should individuals have a right to
possess assault weapons? Should affirmative action, or abortion, or dog sniffs at checkpoints, be law-
ful?-the general populace does have opinions, even if they are difficult to measure.
47. See MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 58-60 (1999).
48. Cf Mark Tushnet, Evaluating Congressional Constitutional Interpretation: Some Criteria and
Two Informal Case Studies, in CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION 269, 269-92 (Neal Devins & Keith
E. Whittington eds., 2005).
49. The book's failure to address this question has not gone unnoticed. See L. A. Powe, Jr., Are
"'the People" Missing in Action (and Should Anyone Care)?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 855, 891-92 (2005)
(book review) ("For a thesis depending on the people, it is surprising that Kramer never tells us who
they (or we) are and how to know whether those claiming to speak in the people's name-Huey Long,
Richard Nixon, and Al Gore, to offer three disparate examples-really are doing that.") (footnotes
omitted).
50. See Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism,
100 COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000); Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role
of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543
(1954).
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not have much of an incentive to spend time and resources doing so. An-
other reason is ideological polarization, exacerbated by an increasingly
aggressive and fine-tuned practice of drawing electoral districts for partisan
advantage. 51 As more and more representatives are remapped into "safe
seats," the locus of political competition shifts from the general election to
the primary, reinforcing the power of ideologically extreme players in both
parties and leaving the median voter increasingly out in the cold.52 While
novel and interesting constitutional understandings might well emerge from
a system in which representatives choose their constituents rather than vice
versa, 53 those understandings seem unlikely to be truly "popular" in the
sense of representing the broad swath of public opinion.
Partisan gerrymandering is itself unconstitutional, on any sensible
popular constitutionalist understanding. 54 Can we expect a popular consti-
tutionalist solution to the problem? The conventional, and probably correct,
answer is, Don't hold your breath. As several observers have pointed out,
this is one area in which the political system is not likely to be self-
correcting, suggesting the need for judicial intervention.55 Indeed, partisan
gerrymandering would seem to be the paradigmatic example of a problem
that the popular branches of government cannot be trusted to solve because
they benefit from the very system they would be called upon to reform.
Tellingly, when California governor Arnold Schwarzenegger attempted in
2005 to shift redistricting authority from legislators to a panel of retired
judges, his proposal was soundly defeated by the voters in a popular initia-
tive. 56 If Schwarzenegger, who is viewed as relatively independent of the
51. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Where to Draw the Line?: Judicial Review
of Political Gerrymanders, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 570 (2004) (describing partisan gerrymandering as
"a mechanism to frustrate the popular electoral will by rendering elected officials a self-perpetuating
caste").
52. See generally Samuel Issacharoff, Collateral Damage: The Endangered Center in American
Politics, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV 415, 427-31 (2004).
53. Ironically, the Framers' vision of bicameralism has now been turned on its head: where once
Senators were chosen by state legislatures and members of the House of Representatives were chosen
by the people, today Senators are chosen by the people while members of the House, thanks to partisan
control over redistricting, are in effect chosen by state legislatures. See Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note
51, at 574.
54. Cf Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004). Despite a fragmented Court that produced five
separate opinions and no majority opinion, all nine Justices agreed that excessive partisanship in redis-
tricting is unconstitutional.
55. See, e.g., Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 51, at 570-77; id. at 570 n.135 (citing numerous
sources for the proposition that partisan redistricting has rendered many elections for legislative office
noncompetitive); cf Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 126 (1986) (plurality opinion) ("It is not clear
that political gerrymandering is a self-limiting enterprise .... ").
56. See Elizabeth Mehren, Ballot Measures Mostly Draw Scowls from Voters, L.A. TIMES, Nov.
10, 2005, at A12. A similar ballot measure was defeated by voters in Ohio. See Sandy Theis, Job Issue
OK'd; Reform Measures Fail, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 9, 2005, at Al. But see Sam Hirsch &
Thomas E. Mann, For Election Reform, a Heartening Defeat, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2005, at A23
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two major parties, 57 is unable to push through such a proposal in the teeth
of major-party opposition, it is highly unlikely that the ordinary political
process will produce the needed reforms. 58 Unfortunately, the fractured
opinions in the Supreme Court's recent partisan gerrymandering cases im-
ply that judicial intervention won't be forthcoming anytime soon.59
The political parties as such are, in any event, not the most natural
candidates for the role of tribune of popular constitutionalism in the
twenty-first century. That distinction must surely belong to the President of
the United States. The President is our only nationally elected official; 60 he
enjoys unparalleled public attention and access to the media; and he has
been, at least since the New Deal, the leader of his national political party,
which during that time has usually been the dominant party in the coun-
try.61 In short, the President is the closest thing we have to an embodiment
of the national popular will.
62
(applauding the defeat of the California and Ohio proposals on the grounds that they would have re-
quired mid-decade redistricting and did not contain fair and enforceable standards).
57. Cf Elizabeth Garrett, Democracy in the Wake of the California Recall, 153 U. PA. L. REV.
239, 282 (2004) ("Schwarzenegger's personal fortune, his ability to raise money, and the tremendous
amount of publicity that surrounds his every move provide credibility to his threat to go over the heads
of state lawmakers,").
58. But see Richard L. Hasen, Looking for Standards (in All the Wrong Places): Partisan Gerry-
mandering Claims After Vieth, 3 ELECTION L.J. 626, 640-41 (2004) (arguing that the issue of partisan
redistricting should be left to the political process).
59. In Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 292, 316 (2004), a divided Court let stand an egregiously
partisan redistricting plan in Pennsylvania, with three Justices (including the late Chief Justice
Rehnquist and the now-retired Justice O'Connor) joining an opinion by Justice Scalia declaring partisan
gerrymandering claims nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine, and Justice Kennedy writing
a pivotal yet cryptic concurring opinion declaring such claims justiciable (though only barely) but
effectively unwinnable. "When all was said and done, the result of Vieth was that a majority of the
Court had expressed unwillingness to entertain challenges to political gerrymanders under any as-yet
articulated standard." Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 51, at 564. This pattern persisted in League of
United Latin American Citizens v. Perry (LULAC), No. 05-204 (U.S. June 28, 2006), which involved a
challenge to Texas's mid-decade partisan redistricting plan. See id., slip op. at 7 (opinion of the Court)
(declining to revisit the Vieth majority's justiciability holding); id., slip op. at 7-14 (opinion of Ken-
nedy, J.) (concluding once again that no workable test for unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering had
been articulated). In LULAC, the two newest members of the Court, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Alito, declined to reach the question of justiciability. See id., slip op. at 1-2 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
60. Though, admittedly, not popularly elected.
61. See Mark Tushnet, Controlling Executive Power in the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV.
2673, 2678-79 (2005). Cf Powe, supra note 49, at 884-85 (giving examples showing how Republican
and Democratic presidents and presidential candidates from Nixon onward have articulated competing
constitutional visions for the country).
62. The idea that the President embodies the popular will-indeed, the entire notion that there
exists an ascertainable "popular will"-has been powerfully criticized, particularly in the context of the
debate in administrative law over the "unitary presidency." See, e.g., Cynthia R. Farina, The Consent of
the Governed: Against Simple Rules for a Complex World, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 987 (1997) (arguing
that the notion of a popular will, as advanced by advocates of strong presidentialism in administrative
law, is neither descriptively useful nor normatively attractive); see also Jide Nzelibe, The Fable of the
Nationalist President and Parochial Congress, 53 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming June 2006) (showing
that the President's constituency is more parochial than is widely believed). I take no position here on
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
Indeed, all of the heroes of popular constitutionalism in Kramer's his-
torical narrative-with the lone exception of the Reconstruction Con-
gresses-are Presidents: Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, Franklin D.
Roosevelt. Kramer could have added Theodore Roosevelt, who famously
claimed to act as "a steward of the people bound actively and affirmatively
to do all he [can] for the people. ' 63 Yet The People Themselves offers sur-
prisingly few examples of actual constitutional interpretation undertaken by
Presidents. 64 Likewise, most scholars who write about extrajudicial consti-
tutional interpretation seem to focus their attention on the legislative
branch.65 The relative lack of attention to executive constitutionalism is
especially surprising given that the Executive Branch, much more than
Congress, contains institutional vehicles for careful and deliberative treat-
ment of constitutional questions. To be sure, legislative committees, par-
ticularly the House and Senate Judiciary Committees, hold hearings on
constitutional issues and stay abreast of the latest constitutional develop-
ments in the courts, 66 and staff agencies help members of Congress develop
whether the President in fact embodies a national "popular will"; for present purposes it is enough that
no other person or institution is in a better position to claim to do so.
63. THEODORE ROOSEVELT, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 389 (1913).
64. Most of these occur in the context of the veto power, a context that does not provide the best
test of the executive role in a system of departmentalism for two reasons. First, the President in exercis-
ing the veto power acts not as an executive but as a defacto third branch of the legislature. See Richard
A. Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term- Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 76
(2005) (referring to the federal legislature as "tricameral because of the President's veto power").
Second, and more important, the veto power, like the pardon power, has long been understood to lie
within the sole and unreviewable discretion of the President. As such, a presidential veto-even if
predicated on expressly constitutional grounds, as was Jackson's bank veto in 1832-represents neither
a distinctively executive nor a particularly daring challenge to judicial supremacy.
65. For examples, see the excellent contributions compiled in CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION,
supra note 48. There are, of course, exceptions to this generalization. For examples of thoughtful
analyses of constitutional interpretation within the executive branch, see David Barron, Constitutional-
ism in the Shadow of Doctrine: The President's Non-Enforcement Power, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Winter/Spring 2000, at 61; Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Most Competent Branches: A Response to
Professor Paulsen, 83 GEO. L.J. 347 (1994); Dawn E. Johnsen, Functional Departmentalism and
Nonjudicial Interpretation: Who Determines Constitutional Meaning?, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Sum-
mer 2004, at 105; Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional
Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1267 (1996); Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Protestantism in The-
ory and Practice: Two Questions for Michael Stokes Paulsen and One for His Critics, 83 GEO. L.J. 373
(1994); Geoffrey P. Miller, The President's Power of Interpretation: Implications of a Unified Theory
of Constitutional Law, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1993, at 35; Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most
Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217 (1994); Cornelia T.L.
Pillard, The Unfulfilled Promise of the Constitution in Executive Hands, 103 MICH. L. REV. 676 (2005);
H. Jefferson Powell, The President's Authority over Foreign Affairs: An Executive Branch Perspective,
67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 527 (1999); and Symposium, Executive Branch Interpretation of the Law, 15
CARDOZO L. REV. 21 (1993).
66. See Keith E. Whittington, Hearing About the Constitution in Congressional Committees, in
CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 48, at 87.
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and articulate constitutional views, 67 particularly on those matters, such as
impeachment, over which Congress has unreviewable discretion. But none
of these legislative resources is as consistently focused on constitutional
issues, or as self-consciously structured for impartial deliberation, as the
Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel ("OLC"). 68
As John McGinnis has observed, since its creation in 1932, OLC has
engaged in various different modes of constitutional interpretation, some-
times taking its lead from the Supreme Court's opinions and at other times
advancing the Executive Branch's independent interpretive views.
69
McGinnis describes several procedural norms that OLC observes in order
to ensure deliberativeness and a proper degree of objectivity: it generally
publishes its opinions; it has a policy of not giving opinions on issues cur-
rently in litigation; and it does not give opinions on the legality of execu-
tive agency action without first soliciting a legal opinion from the relevant
agency.70 These procedures and practices demonstrate that the President,
through OLC and other institutions, is well-positioned to articulate inde-
pendent, extrajudicial, and popularly-informed constitutional understand-
ings.
Can we trust the President, using institutional resources such as OLC,
to perform well as a popular constitutionalist? This essay does not purport
to answer this question, but only to underline its centrality to any contem-
porary theory of popular constitutionalism. To further clarify the issues at
stake, I offer two brief illustrative case studies. Though these case studies
may seem at first to be worlds apart, both raise questions about the Presi-
dent's capacity to develop independent, reasonable constitutional under-
standings in a deliberative and transparent way.
Assisted suicide and federalism. The case of Gonzales v. Oregon, re-
cently decided by the Supreme Court, grew out of Oregon's enactment of
67. See Louis Fisher, Constitutional Analysis by Congressional Staff Agencies, in CONGRESS AND
THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 48, at 64.
68. The Attorney General is obligated by statute to "give his advice and opinion on questions of
law when required by the President," as well as to provide advice, upon request, to the heads of the
executive departments "on questions of law arising in the administration of [their] department[s]." 28
U.S.C. §§ 511-512 (2000). The Attorney General has delegated this opinion function to OLC. See 28
C.F.R. § 0.25(b) (2005). There are other venues for constitutional interpretation within the Executive
Branch as well, such as the White House Counsel's office and, to some extent, the Office of the Solici-
tor General.
69. John 0. McGinnis, Models of the Opinion Function of the Attorney General: A Normative,
Descriptive, and Historical Prolegomenon, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 375 (1993).
70. Id. at 425-28. As Harold Koh has pointed out, OLC has not always adhered to these policies,
particularly in politically controversial matters. Harold Hongju Koh, Protecting the Office of Legal
Counselfrom Itself 15 CARDozo L. REV. 513, 514-15 (1993).
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the Death with Dignity Act by popular initiative in 1994. 71 This state law
permits doctors, under certain conditions, to prescribe drugs to enable
competent, terminally ill patients to commit suicide. 72 The federal Con-
trolled Substances Act ("CSA")73 extensively regulates the prescription and
distribution of several such drugs. A regulation promulgated by the Drug
Enforcement Administration ("DEA") pursuant to the CSA provides that
"[a] prescription for a controlled substance to be effective must be issued
for a legitimate medical purpose by an individual practitioner acting in the
usual course of his professional practice.
'74
In 1998, Attorney General Janet Reno concluded that "the CSA does
not authorize DEA to prosecute, or to revoke the DEA registration of, a
physician who has assisted in a suicide in compliance with Oregon law."'
75
In particular, Attorney General Reno stated, "There is no evidence that
Congress, in the CSA, intended to displace the states as the primary regula-
tors of the medical profession, or to override a state's determination as to
what constitutes legitimate medical practice in the absence of a federal law
prohibiting that practice. ' 76 Bills were introduced in Congress that would
have granted the federal government express authority to regulate physi-
cian-assisted suicide, but they were not enacted.
77
In 2001, however, Attorney General John Ashcroft revisited the ques-
tion after soliciting a memorandum from OLC but without consulting Ore-
gon or any federal agency outside the Justice Department. 78 OLC's
71. 126 S. Ct. 904, 911 (2006).
72. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800-127.995 (2003). The patient must make an oral request to his or
her attending physician and a written request attested by two witnesses, and must reiterate the oral
request at least fifteen days after the initial oral request. §§ 127.810(1), 127.840. Two doctors must
determine that the patiently is mentally capable, is "suffering from a terminal disease," and has volun-
tarily expressed a wish to accelerate the dying process. §§ 127.805(1), 127.815(1), 127.820. The statute
contains elaborate provisions designed to ensure that the patient makes an informed, voluntary, and
independent choice. See §§ 127.815(1), 127.820, 127.825. The attending physician may prescribe and
dispense the lethal drugs, but may not terminate a patient's life by active euthanasia or administering a
lethal injection. § 127.880.
73. 21 U.S.C. § 801 (2000).
74. 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) (2005).
75. Memorandum from Sheldon Bradshaw, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., & Robert J. Dela-
hunty, Special Counsel, Office of Legal Counsel, to the Attorney Gen. of the U.S., Whether Physician-
Assisted Suicide Serves a "Legitimate Medical Purpose" Under the Drug Enforcement Administration's
Regulations Implementing the Controlled Substances Act 109a (June 27, 2001), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/2004/2pet/7pet/2004-0623.pet.app.pdf [hereinafter OLC Memo]
(quoting Letter from Janet Reno, Attorney Gen. of the U.S., to Henry J. Hyde, Chairman, Comm. on the
Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives 1 (June 5, 1998), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/1998/June/259ag.htm.html).
76. Id.
77. See Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 913 (citing H.R. 4006, 105th Cong. (2d Sess. 1998);
H.R. 2260, 106th Cong. (1st Sess. 1999)).
78. Id. at 913-14.
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memorandum concluded that "assisting in suicide is not a 'legitimate medi-
cal purpose' that would justify a physician's dispensing controlled sub-
stances consistent with the CSA."179 Acting on this advice, the Attorney
General published an "interpretative rule" in the Federal Register adopting
the OLC position.80 The question formally presented to the Supreme Court
in Gonzales v. Oregon was whether the CSA and its implementing regula-
tions were permissibly construed by the Attorney General to prohibit doc-
tors in Oregon (or elsewhere in the United States) from prescribing and
distributing federally controlled drugs for the purpose of assisting a sui-
cide. 81
The Supreme Court's decision in the case was not particularly surpris-
ing. Writing for a six-justice majority, Justice Kennedy began by noting
that, although the case touched on sensitive matters of morality and poli-
tics, "its resolution requires an inquiry familiar to the courts: interpreting a
federal statute to determine whether Executive action is authorized by, or
otherwise consistent with, the enactment. ' 82 The majority opinion pro-
ceeded to reject the government's arguments that the Attorney General
deserved interpretive deference, either on the ground that he was construing
one of his own regulations or on the ground that he was construing an am-
biguous statute that Congress had charged him with administering. 83 "The
statutory terms 'public interest' and 'public health' [in the CSA] do not call
on the Attorney General, or any other Executive official, to make an inde-
pendent assessment of the meaning of federal law."'84 Construing the statute
for itself, the Court held that the CSA was intended to regulate medical
practice only insofar as was necessary to prevent doctors from using their
drug-prescribing licenses as a cover for pushing, or trafficking in, illicit
drugs.85 The Court accordingly invalidated the Attorney General's interpre-
tative rule.
86
From a traditional lawyer's perspective, there was no colorable consti-
tutional issue in Gonzales v. Oregon. The Court's recent decision in Gonza-
les v. Raich, upholding the constitutionality of the CSA as applied to local,
79. OLC Memo, supra note 75, at 130a.
80. Dispensing of Controlled Substances to Assist Suicide, 66 Fed. Reg. 56,607, 56,607-08 (Nov.
9, 2001) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1306).
81. Brief for Petitioners at (I), Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904 (No. 04-623).
82. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. at 911.
83. Id. at915-22.
84. Id. at 919. See also id. at 922 ("The deference here is tempered by the Attorney General's lack
of expertise in this area and the apparent absence of any consultation with anyone outside the Depart-
ment of Justice who might aid in a reasoned judgment.").
85. Id. at 922-25.
86. Id. at 925.
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noncommercial, medical use of marijuana, 87 and its 1997 decision in Wash-
ington v. Glucksberg, refusing to recognize a fundamental right to assisted
suicide, 88 together foreclosed any constitutional challenge to the Attorney
General's action. And, indeed, the Court's decision in Oregon did not ad-
dress constitutional issues at all.89 The majority even disavowed any reli-
ance on constitutionally motivated canons of statutory construction such as
"clear statement" rules.90
Yet from a popular constitutionalist's perspective, the case was replete
with constitutional questions. After all, the popular constitutionalist does
not read Raich to say that every activity that falls within the literal terms of
the CSA may constitutionally be regulated--only that the Court, for rea-
sons of institutional capacity, has left that question to the other branches. 91
Now that the Supreme Court has put the brakes on as-applied challenges to
congressional exercises of the commerce power,92 it will often be up to the
Executive Branch, and the Attorney General in particular, to determine
whether to enforce a Commerce Clause statute "to the hilt" or to carve out
particular applications for non-enforcement in light of constitutional con-
87. 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2198-2201 (2005).
88. 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997).
89. By the same token, the briefing and argument in the Supreme Court focused entirely on mat-
ters of statutory and regulatory construction. To be sure, Oregon urged the Court to adopt a constitu-
tionally informed "clear statement" rule or to interpret the statute narrowly to avoid constitutional
doubts, but it did not press a constitutional claim directly. Brief for Respondent State of Oregon at 27-
47, Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904 (No. 04-623); see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 43-44, 56, Oregon,
126 S. Ct. 904 (No. 04-623) (counsel for Oregon attempting to argue that the Attorney General's con-
struction of the Controlled Substances Act implicates clear-statement and avoidance doctrines). For his
part, the Solicitor General essentially denied that the Attorney General's action raised any constitutional
concerns at all. Brief for the Petitioners at 37-42, Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904 (No. 04-623); see also Tran-
script of Oral Argument at 59, Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904 (No. 04-623) (argument by Solicitor General that
there is no Commerce Clause issue in the case).
90. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. at 925 ("It is unnecessary even to consider the application of clear state-
ment requirements .... "). On the other hand, the Court's interpretation of the CSA did appear to be
motivated by an awareness that a contrary reading could alter the traditional federal-state balance. See
id. ("[T]he background principles of our federal system also belie the notion that Congress would use
such an obscure grant of authority to regulate areas traditionally supervised by the States' police
power.... The text and structure of the CSA show that Congress did not have this far-reaching intent to
alter the federal-state balance and the congressional role in maintaining it.").
91. See Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2208 ("In assessing the scope of Congress' authority under the Com-
merce Clause, we stress that the task before us is a modest one. We need not determine whether respon-
dents' activities, taken in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce in fact, but only
whether a 'rational basis' exists for so concluding."). Cf Oregon, 126 S. Ct. at 939 (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing) ("Unless we are to repudiate a long and well-established principle of our jurisprudence, using the
federal commerce power to prevent assisted suicide is unquestionably permissible. The question before
us is not whether Congress can do this, or even whether Congress should do this; but simply whether
Congress has done this in the CSA.") (emphases in original).
92. See David L. Franklin, Facial Challenges, Legislative Purpose, and the Commerce Clause, 92
IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2006) (on file with author); Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning,
What Hath Raich Wrought? Five Takes, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 915, 916-18 (2005) (concluding
that Raich put an end to as-applied Commerce Clause challenges).
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cems about federalism. Likewise, the popular constitutionalist does not
read Glucksberg to say that the Court has resolved the question of the right
to assisted suicide or the power to prohibit it. Indeed, the Court in Glucks-
berg was careful to point out that "[t]hroughout the Nation, Americans are
engaged in an earnest and profound debate about the morality, legality, and
practicality of physician-assisted suicide. Our holding permits this debate
to continue, as it should in a democratic society." 93
In short, the fact that the Court in Gonzales v. Oregon held the Execu-
tive Branch to have strayed beyond the limits of its statutoly authority does
not mean that the Executive was not faced with constitutional questions in
the case. Presidential popular constitutionalism could have expressed itself
here in two ways. On the one hand, a robust commitment to federalism on
the part of the Executive Branch would have resulted in a decision to allow
the national debate over assisted suicide to continue by declining to enforce
the CSA against doctors in Oregon. On the other hand, a robust commit-
ment to a constitutional "culture of life" would have reinforced the stance
actually taken by the Attorney General. 94 In either event, on a popular con-
stitutionalist view, the Executive Branch was obligated to wrestle with
questions of constitutional and not merely statutory dimension in deciding
whether to issue its directive concerning assisted suicide.
The OLC memorandum on which the Attorney General's action was
based shows little evidence of such wrestling. In particular, the memoran-
dum pays scant attention to the interest in allowing states in a federal sys-
tem to experiment with diverse solutions to a controversial social and
ethical problem. Instead, OLC appeared to view the Supreme Court as the
appropriate institution to vindicate those federalism interests at a constitu-
tional level95 and Congress as the appropriate body to vindicate them at a
political level. 96 To use McGinnis's typology, OLC's constitutional analy-
sis in this instance was "court-centered." 97 And even within this court-
centered context, it is surprising how little attention OLC paid to federalism
concerns, especially given that its opinion in the assisted suicide matter was
issued before the Court upheld the CSA against a federalism-based chal-
93. 521 U.S. at 735.
94. See, e.g., Michael A. Fletcher, Bush Hails Progress Toward 'Culture of Life': Limits on
Abortion, Stem Cell Use Cited, WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 2005, at A3.
95. See OLC Memo, supra note 75, at 134a-135a ("[W]e think it shows no disrespect for the
principles of federalism to conclude that the States cannot, by their unilateral actions, shelter their
physicians from the Federal narcotics code.").
96. See id. at 145a ("Congress remains free to alter the terms on which the DEA acts: it could,
e.g., carve out an exception for the use of controlled substances by physicians to assist suicide.").
97. McGinnis, supra note 69, at 382-89 (describing court-centered mode of Executive Branch
reasoning).
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lenge in Raich. It is perhaps too much to expect that the Executive Branch
would respond to judicial underenforcement of federalism norms by under-
taking a completely independent constitutional analysis. Still, the apparent
absence of constitutional deliberation by the Executive Branch in this case
should be enough to give the would-be popular constitutionalist some
pause.
NSA Surveillance. President Bush recently sparked controversy by
admitting that he secretly authorized the National Security Agency to
eavesdrop on the international telephone conversations and emails of
United States citizens without seeking court approval. 98 The President au-
thorized this surveillance in the face of a federal statute that provides that
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 ("FISA")9 9 and other
specified statutory provisions concerning investigative wiretaps constitute
the "exclusive means by which electronic surveillance... may be con-
ducted."' 0 0 FISA requires the government to obtain a warrant from a spe-
cial secret court within seventy-two hours of initiating electronic
surveillance, and provides that a warrant shall issue if "there is probable
cause to believe that ... the target of the electronic surveillance is a foreign
power or an agent of a foreign power .... -101 Moreover, FISA states that it
is a criminal offense to "engage[] in electronic surveillance under color of
law except as authorized by statute." 102 In a provision specifically address-
ing wartime surveillance, FISA provides that "[n]otwithstanding any other
law, the President, through the Attorney General, may authorize electronic
surveillance without a court order under this subchapter to acquire foreign
intelligence information for a period not to exceed fifteen calendar days
following a declaration of war by the Congress."'
103
Despite concerns reportedly raised by officials from all three branches
of the federal government, the NSA eavesdropping program was supported
by legal opinions from within the Executive Branch. The Department of
98. See James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at Al; David E. Sanger, In Address, Bush Says He Ordered Domestic Spying,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2005, at 1. Months later, more controversy erupted amidst reports that the NSA
had collected records of tens of millions of telephone calls in the United States. See Leslie Cauley, NSA
Has Massive Database of Americans' Phone Calls: 3 Telecoms Help Government Collect Billions of
Domestic Records, USA TODAY, May 11, 2006, at IA.
99. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 (2000).
100. 18 U.S.C. § 251 l(2)(f) (2000).
101. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1802(a)(1), 1803(a), 1805(a)(3). Department of Justice statistics indicate that the
FISA court has granted virtually every warrant application presented to it since its creation in 1979. See
FISA Orders 1979-2004, http://www.epic.org/privacy/wiretap/stats/fisa-stats.html (last visited Feb. 21,
2006).
102. 50 U.S.C. § 1809(a)(1).
103. Id. § 1811.
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Justice defended the program initially in a letter to the chairmen and rank-
ing members of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees,104 and later
and at greater length in a detailed white paper.
105
The Bush administration's defense of the legality of the NSA surveil-
lance program rests on two arguments. First, the Executive Branch argues
that FISA's requirement of statutory authorization was satisfied as applied
to communications involving suspected al Qaeda operatives by Congress's
passage of the Authorization of Use of Military Force (AUMF) shortly
after September 11, 2001.106 The AUMF authorizes the President
to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organi-
zations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or
aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or har-
bored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts
of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, or-
ganizations or persons. 107
Although the AUMF does not mention warrantless surveillance, the
Executive Branch argues that the AUMF implicitly authorizes such surveil-
lance. This argument relies heavily on Justice O'Connor's opinion for a
plurality of the Supreme Court in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, which concluded that
the AUMF satisfied the requirement of the so-called Non-Detention Act
that any detention of an American citizen be "pursuant to an Act of Con-
gress." 108 If the AUMF was sufficient to overcome the Non-Detention Act,
the argument goes, it must also be sufficient to overcome the requirements
of FISA.109
Second, and even more adventurously, the Executive Branch argues
that the President's inherent power under the Commander-in-Chief Clause
of Article II "includes the authority to order warrantless foreign intelli-
gence surveillance within the United States," and that Congress has no
power to regulate that authority via FISA or any other statute.1 10
104. Letter from William E. Moschella, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Pat
Roberts, Chairman, Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence, et al. (Dec. 22, 2005), available at
http://www.cdt.org/security/20051222justiceletter.pdf [hereinafter DOJ Letter].
105. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Legal Authorities Supporting the Activities of the National Security
Agency Described by the President (Jan. 19, 2006), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/whitepaperonnsalegalauthorities.pdf [hereinafter DOJ White Paper].
106. DOJ Letter, supra note 104, at 2-4; DOJ White Paper, supra note 105, at 10-17.
107. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224, 224 (2001).
108. 542 U.S. 507, 517 (2004) (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J.). The plurality assumed, without
deciding, that the Non-Detention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2000), applied to military detentions. Id.
109. DOJ Letter, supra note 104, at 3; DOJ White Paper, supra note 105, at 12-13.
110. DOJ Letter, supra note 104, at 2; DOJ White Paper, supra note 105, at 6-10. See also The
President's News Conference, 41 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1885, 1887 (Dec. 19, 2005) ("[T]he legal
authority is derived from the Constitution, as well as the authorization of force by the United States
Congress."). Similarly, a 2002 brief submitted by the government argued that "the Constitution vests in
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The Executive Branch's legal analysis in this instance does not meet
the test of reasonableness. The statutory argument that the broadly worded
AUMF is sufficient to satisfy or supersede FISA's carefully crafted re-
quirements is simply untenable. FISA expressly prohibits warrantless sur-
veillance except in precisely delineated circumstances, and there is no
indication that Congress intended to authorize domestic wiretapping of
U.S. citizens when it authorized "all necessary and appropriate force" in the
wake of the September 11 attacks.II Indeed, Tom Daschle, who was the
majority leader in the Senate when the AUMF was enacted, recalls that the
Bush administration sought to insert the words "in the United States and"
after "appropriate force" in the draft version of the AUMF, in order to au-
thorize the President to take domestic action, but that the Senate leadership
rejected the proposed change. 112 As for Hamdi, it is readily distinguishable:
detaining active enemy combatants captured on a battlefield abroad is in-
herent in the use of force for purposes of war in a way that eavesdropping
on American citizens within the United States is not. 113
If any doubt remained about the unreasonableness of the Executive
Branch's statutory analysis in the NSA surveillance matter, it was put to
rest by the Supreme Court's decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.114 In Ham-
dan, the Court held that the AUMF does not authorize the President to con-
vene special military commissions to try suspected Al Qaeda operatives." 15
the President inherent authority to conduct warrantless intelligence surveillance (electronic or other-
wise) of foreign powers or their agents, and Congress cannot by statute extinguish that constitutional
authority." See Supplemental Brief for the United States at Part II1.A., No. 02-001 (FISA Ct. of Review
Sept. 25, 2002), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/092502sup.html.
By the same token, the administration has suggested that Congress's 2001 amendments to the
National Security Act, which require the Executive Branch to brief members of Congress rather exten-
sively in writing concerning the government's national security activities, unduly interfere with the
President's Article II authority and are to that extent unconstitutional. 50 U.S.C. §§ 403q, 413(a)-(c)
(Supp. 11 2004); Statement on Signing the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, 2 PUB.
PAPERS 1555 (Dec. 28, 2001); Douglas Jehl, Spy Briefings Failed to Meet Legal Test, Lawmakers Say,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2005, at A36.
I 1. Even assuming the AUMF counts as a declaration of war, Congress in enacting the AUMF
only triggered a limited, fifteen-day exception to FISA. 50 U.S.C. § 1811 (2000).
112. Tom Daschle, Power We Didn't Grant, WASH. POST, Dec. 23, 2005 at A21.
113. Tellingly, in the same briefing in which the Attorney General argued that a warrantless sur-
veillance program was consistent with FISA, he also conceded the opposite proposition by noting that
the Executive Branch had unsuccessfully attempted to get FISA amended to authorize a warrantless
surveillance program. See Press Briefing by Attorney Gen. Alberto Gonzales and Gen. Michael Hay-
den, Principal Deputy Dir. for Nat'l Intelligence (Dec. 19, 2005), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051219-I.html ("We have had discussions with
Congress in the past-certain members of Congress-as to whether or not FISA could be amended to
allow us to adequately deal with this kind of threat, and we were advised that that would be difficult, if
not impossible.").
114. No. 05-184 (U.S. June 29, 2006).
115. Id., slip. op. at 29-30.
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Rather, the Court held that in the absence of clear authorizing legislation
the President must abide by the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)
and the Geneva Conventions, which in turn require military commission
proceedings to comply with the law of war.1 16 The lesson for the NSA
controversy is clear: if the AUMF is insufficient to overcome the implicit
and rather vague restrictions on military commissions embodied in the
UCMJ-which includes deferential language permitting the President to
depart from the ordinary rules governing criminal trials "so far as he con-
siders practicable" ' 17-then the AUMF is surely insufficient to overcome
the explicit, comprehensive, and criminally enforceable limitations on elec-
tronic surveillance embodied in FISA.118
But it is the Executive Branch's constitutional analysis in the NSA
matter that is particularly troubling. 119 In contrast to OLC's analysis of
assisted suicide, which deflected responsibility for safeguarding the values
of federalism to Congress and the judiciary, the executive's analysis of the
NSA surveillance program shows no regard for the checking function of
the other branches. The paramount importance of that checking function
was emphasized by Justice Stevens's opinion for the Court in Hamdan, as
well as by Justices Breyer and Kennedy in their concurring opinions.
120
From a popular constitutionalist perspective, too, there is a serious prob-
lem: until it was exposed by the media, the NSA surveillance program was
carried out, and justified, in secret. It may well turn out that "the people"
support the President's actions in this area. Yet if the President's constitu-
tional authority as Commander-in-Chief entitles him clandestinely to ig-
nore any and all statutes that he believes impinge upon his ability to
prosecute a war of unknown duration against a stateless enemy-including
statutes that prohibit torture, detention of U.S. citizens, and domestic wire-
116. Id., slip op. at 25-30.
117. 10U.S.C. § 836(a)(2000).
118. Astonishingly, the Executive Branch has continued to argue that the NSA surveillance pro-
gram is authorized by the AUMF even after Hamdan. See Letter from William E. Moschella, Assistant
Attomey Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Senator Charles Schumer (July 10, 2006), available at
http://lawculture.blogs.com/lawculture/files/NSA.Hamdan.response.schumer.pdf [hereinafter DOJ
Hamdan letter].
119. I leave aside any Fourth Amendment issues that may be raised by the NSA program.
120. See Hamdan, slip op. at 29 n.23 ("Whether or not the President has independent power, absent
congressional authorization, to convene military commissions, he may not disregard limitations that
Congress has, in proper exercise of its own war powers, placed on his powers."); id., slip op. at 1
(Breyer, J., concurring) ("Where, as here, no emergency prevents consultation with Congress, judicial
insistence upon that consultation does not weaken our Nation's ability to deal with danger."); id., slip
op. at I (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Respect for laws derived from the customary operation of the
Executive and Legislative Branches gives some assurance of stability in time of crisis. The Constitution
is best preserved by reliance on standards tested over time and insulated from the pressures of the
moment.").
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tapping-then not only is popular constitutionalism undermined, but the
very notion of the rule of law is in peril. 121
These case studies are of course unscientific and anecdotal; they are
meant to be suggestive rather than definitive. What they suggest, however,
is that one cannot address the issue of popular constitutionalism in 2006
without addressing the issue of presidential constitutionalism-and that
presidential constitutionalism as it is currently practiced does not do a very
good job of satisfying basic criteria of deliberativeness, transparency, and
reasonableness. The people today do not speak for themselves on constitu-
tional issues; increasingly, the President of the United States will claim to
speak for them. Can we trust him to do so? It is a question that Kramer and
other advocates of popular constitutionalism would do well to examine.
121. In the wake of Hamdan, the Executive Branch again argued that the President enjoys inherent
authority to collect foreign intelligence within the United States notwithstanding any congressional
regulation to the contrary, and suggested that FISA was unconstitutional insofar as it restricted that
authority. See DOJ Hamdan Letter, supra note 118, at 2-3. For a prominent articulation of the Execu-
tive Branch's legal rationales for unlimited inherent presidential power during wartime, see Memoran-
dum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to the President, The
President's Constitutional Authority to Conduct Military Operations Against Terrorists and Nations
Supporting Them (Sept. 25, 2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/warpowers925.htm.
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